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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SHOULD RELIABLE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
BE CONCLUSIVE AND BINDING ON THE JURY?
Occasionally a case arises where reliable scientific evidence which is directly
related to the ultimate issue would appear to dictate the resolution of the case:
yet, the jury returns a verdict contrary to the scientific evidence. For example,
in a paternity case where the blood tests have excluded the putative father, the
jury finds he is the father of the child.1 Such verdicts stimulate critics to assert
that the jury went beyond the traditional fact finding and truth seeking functions
assigned to it.2 The proposed remedy for this problem is to make reliable
scientific evidence binding on the jury, thereby eliminating the option of re-
jecting the evidence.
The position established herein is that even the most reliable scientific
evidence should not be conclusive and binding on a jury. The issue will be
examined on its merits, to the exclusion of pleas favoring the jury system and
constitutional problems. The discussion will center on these areas: rules of
evidence which affect verdicts, an examination of the reliability of various
sciences with a view toward specific situations, and the problems which would
be generated by judicial or legislative promulgation of a rule of conclusiveness
concerning scientific evidence.
RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
Initial recognition should be given to the fact that it is the exception rather
than the rule to find uncontroverted scientific evidence in a case. Controversy
usually centers upon conflicting expert testimony, allegations of improper sci-
entific technique, or disagreement as to the conclusiveness of the scientific
evidence itself. Inability to controvert the scientific evidence in some manner
probably contributes to pre-trial settlements.3 Thus, many cases where the sci-
entific evidence is extremely reliable never reach the jury. When purportedly
reliable scientific evidence does reach the jury, and the jury rejects this evi-
dence, is the situation of concern here despite the rarity of the occurrence.
Present rules of evidence adequately prevent verdicts contrary to uncon-
troverted evidence. Judges can non-suit parties, direct a verdict at the end of
plaintiff's or defendant's evidence, or set aside a verdict which is contrary to
the evidence. 4 A verdict in opposition to immutable laws of science cannot be
left standing.
1 See, e.g., Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946).
2 Note, Evidence: Bastards: Infants: Parent and Child: Blood Tests as Proof of Non-
Parentage, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 277 (1951) ; and, Note, Evidence: Conclusiveness of the Exclu-
sionary Blood Test, 17 Okla. L. Rev. 201 (1964).
3 Gordon, The Use of Scientific Evidence and Its Legal Limitations, 9 J. For. Sci. 301, at
310 (1964).
4 Bush, Law and Tactics in Jury Trials, ch. 10, § 151 (Students' ed. 1950). For a case
39
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Where scientific evidence is controverted in some manner the issue of
whether a verdict should be directed does not lend itself to easy solution. If
controversy results from contradictory scientific evidence, a genuine issue of
fact is present for the jury to resolve. In this situation the proposed conclusive
rule would have no application because the scientific evidence is, in fact, in-
conclusive.
If the scientific evidence is controverted by non-scientific testimony of wit-
nesses, a different issue results. Here the courts have split over whether a verdict
contrary to the scientific evidence should be overturned,5 or whether the verdict
must stand because a genuine issue of fact- was generated.6 The courts in the
former category depend on the reliability of the scientific evidence while the
courts in the latter category treat scientific evidence as having the same weight
as the non-scientific testimony. To a large extent, of course, the courts in both
categories are influenced by the specific factual situations. But even in this
unsettled area, where presumably a conclusive rule would be beneficial, such
a rule is unnecessary.
Under the test used by a majority of courts to determine whether a verdict
should be directed, if there is any evidence which could sustain a verdict for
the non-moving party, the motion would be denied.7 In those jurisdictions where
scientific evidence and eye witness testimony are given the same weight, the
motion for a directed verdict would be denied. The gradual adoption of a new
test for a directed verdict changes this result.
The new test for a directed verdict requires, "... if the evidence as a whole
so overwhelmingly preponderates in favor of the moving party as to leave no
doubt as to the factual truth, then he is entitled to a directed verdict as a matter
of law, even though there is some evidence which, if standing alone, would
jusify a verdict to the contrary." The essence of the new test is a comparison
of the evidence and not an examination of the evidence in favor of the non-
moving party. The new test would permit a directed verdict where unequivocal
scientific evidence is weighed against lay witness testimony.9 For instance, where
blood tests which exclude the putative father are compared with the plaintiff's
uncorroborated testimony, a verdict could be directed under the new test which
where reversal was required because the verdict was contrary to incontrovertible physical facts,
see Lamp v. Penn R. Co., 305 Pa. 520, 185 Atl. 269 (1913).
5 Directed Verdicts on Uncontradicted Testimony, 1959 Trial Lawyers Guide 65, at 83.
6 See, McCarthy v. Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1954). In fact, the line
between opinion evidence (having the least probative value) and expert testimony regarded as
fact (fingerprint evidence) is not clearly drawn. Thus, the present stage of battle is not at the
conclusive level as much as it is at the stage of what weight should be given to the testimony,
if at all.
7 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2494, at 296 (3d ed. 1940).
8 Note, Evidence-Sufficiency for Directed Verdicts--Can a fudge Hold a Candle to Twelve
Reasonable Men? 28 De Paul L. Rev. 322 (1968).
9 See, Pedrich v. Peoria & Eastern R. Co., 37 IMI. 2d 494, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967), where
testimony concerning physical evidence given by laymen, and contradictory to the plaintiff's
testimony, was a sufficient basis for a directed verdict.
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could not have been directed under the old test. To the extent that credibility
of witness and specific factual situations influence this result, the new test for
a directed verdict offers flexibility which a conclusive rule would deny. There-
fore, adoption of the comparison test for a directed verdict is preferable to
adoption of a conclusive rule.
RELIABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Scientific evidence can be divided into three categories of reliability: sci-
entific evidence which is least accurate, scientific evidence accepted by the courts
but not 100% reliable, and scientific evidence which speaks for itself in absolute
terms.
The social sciences and the polygraph test are representative of the least
accurate scientific evidence. These are not considered here because serious doubt
exists as to their probative value. The sciences in this category (least accurate)
generally have not been sanctioned by the courts but within this category some
proponents of particular sciences assert a high degree of reliability. The poly-
graph, for example, has been said to be 99% accurate, although others allege it
to have a 307 accuracy.' 0 Although the truth probably lies between the two
extremes, the position of the polygraph advocates illustrates that those who
should know the accuracy of their science can be either hasty or biased when
they have an interest in gaining acceptance. These advocates, albeit few in num-
ber, present a danger where acceptance is sought to bring the science within
the purview of the proposed conclusive rule. If those very experts who know
the most about the science are biased, or overly eager, how can the accuracy
of the science be objectively determined?
The category of sciences which is accepted by courts, but is not 100%
reliable is exemplified by tests to determine intoxication and medical testimony.
Two characteristics of this type of evidence prevent it from being conclusive
although the sciences in this category are accepted as having probative value.
The first characteristic of the category of scientific evidence which renders
it less than 100% conclusive is that uncontrollable variables prevent certainty.
The correlation, for instance, between alcohol influencing the brain and that
found in the blood stream or on the breath depends on, inter alia, a time factor,
the age and weight of the suspect and his "experience with intoxicants.""
The second characteristic of this category of evidence which renders it less
than 100% conclusive is that while the test results remain constant, the opinions
drawn from the test results do not. Medical opinion illustrates this point. A
research team found that in 24 of 100 cases where X-rays were used as evidence
they had been interpreted incorrectly. 12 Disagreement between the treating
10 Note, Evolving Methods of Scientific Proof, 13 N.Y.L. Forum 683, at 693 (1966).
11 Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 Utah L. Rev.
313, at 317 (1964).
12 Myers, 'The Battle of the Imports:' A New Approach to an Old Problem in Medical
Testimony, 44 Neb. L. Rev. 539 (1965).
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doctor and the pathologist concerning the cause of death is not uncommon.13
The problem of reliability is further complicated by the method used to
present medical opinion. The law looks for a single cause of death whereas most
deaths are due to multiple factors.14 Thus the testimony elicited from doctors
is sometimes different from that which they would like to give. This fact is true
not only of causes of death but also true concerning causes of fatal traffic ac-
cidents. A research group has exploded the belief that fatal traffic accidents can
be attributed to a single cause (drinking, sleeping, speeding, etc.) .'5
Another problem of reliability is that no standard meaning can be given
to the term "cause of death.""' What is thought to be the cause of death has
always been relative to the time and status of medical knowledge. As medical
science evolves what was thought to be a cause of death may actually be only
a symptom.
17
Where uncontrollable variables are present, where interpretation is neces-
sary, and where opinion evidence of causation is involved, enactment of a rule
of conclusivness would be imprudent. The jury must be allowed to determine the
weight of the evidence.
The final category and the most reliable scientific evidence is that scientific
evidence which speaks for itself in absolute terms. In this category proponents
of a conclusive rule would point to ballistics, fingerprints, neutron-activation
analysis and blood tests. If the results of these tests are not inconclusive, the
accuracy of the findings are over 997.18
Scientific evidence which is highly reliable is vulnerable where the findings
approach a degree of inconclusiveness or where improper techniques were used.
Assuming the proposed conclusive rule were in effect, it could not be applied
where any basis for the above defects exists. The conclusive rule could, therefore,
be circumvented by alleging these defects; and, such allgations would become
standardized defenses. Who would make the determination of whether a basis
to allegations of inconclusive findings or improper techniques exists? The alter-
native to letting the issue go to the jury is to have a "battle of experts" at a
pre-trial hearing. The weakness of the pre-trial hearing approach is that a
judge would merely duplicate what is done by a jury in the normal course of
events. Or, if opposing experts are not used, the judge would have to inquire,
hopefully with the same force and effect as an interested party would on cross-
examination. In addition, the judge would have to resolve the issue competently
because he does not have the protection which is afforded a jury by the general
verdict. The judge must, as a professional individual, face the prospect of
13 See, e.g., Kaercher v. Miller, 25 Pa. 2d 518 (1962).
14 Bohrod, The Meaning of 'Cause of Death,' 8 J. For. Sci. 15 (1961).
15 Gordon, supra n.3, at 305.
16 Bohrod, supra n.14.
17 Id.
Is See generally, Note, supra n.10, pp. 613 to 775.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
reversal of a specific finding of fact. A systematic reluctance to face such con-
sequences is evident in our present system. 19
Fingerprints are so unique that if the results are not inconclusive, no two
experts would disagree on the findings. 20 At least twelve points or characteristics
of a fingerprint must be present to make a conclusive finding. 21 If the finger-
print is unclear, a conclusive finding is impossible.22 Also, some skin disease
may alter fingerprints.23 Therefore, even uniquely definitive fingerprint evidence
is susceptible to the problems of reliability.
Fingerprint evidence, as with ballistics and neutron-activation analysis,
seldom dictates the resolution of the ultimate issue in a case. It is usually used
in conjunction with other evidence. The totality of evidence is then weighed in
view of the opposing party's theory of the case. Viewed in this context, a need
for a conclusive rule cannot be shown. The jury probably accepts the scientific
evidence as conclusive in establishing what it purports to establish, but other
factors must be considered before the ultimate issue is resolved. Enacting a
conclusive rule is unnecessary and such action would only serve to unduly em-
phasize the scientific evidence. The jury will, in effect, be told to regard the
defendant guilty until he justifies the presence of his fingerprints.
Creation of a conclusive rule for ballistic evidence would be attended by a
unique problem. Once two bullets can be matched, the findings are highly ac-
curate. A problem exists, however, where the bullets do not match and the
suspect's gun is excluded. Subsequent firings can alter a gun.24 Thus ballistics
tests could wrongly exclude the gun which was actually involved. If a conclusive
rule is in force, is the suspect entitled to the benefit of the rule as well as the
burden? If so, a suspect's gun will be conclusively excluded even though it was,
in fact, the gun involved.
The problem of overemphasis of the importance of the ballistics test is also
present. In a "close" case where the ballistics test match the bullets but the
defendant asserts his gun was stolen and replaced, the conclusive rule may sway
the jury to disregard a defense which, under the present rules, may be given
some credence.
Neuton-activation analysis (NAA) is deemed to be highly accurate, and it
offers fantastic potential as the newest type of scientific evidence. 25 Although
NAA has only recently been accepted in courts, due to its high degree of re-
liability, it must be considered for the benefit of the conclusive rule.
19 Richardson, Modem Scientific Evidence, § 5.6 at 107 (1961k5 "-
20 Moenssens, Admissibility of Fingerprint Evidence and Constitutional Objections to
Fingerprinting Raised in Criminal and Civil Cases, 40 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 85, at 95 (1963).
21 Id. at 99.
22 Id.
23 Ahrens, Scientific Evidence and the Law, 13 N.Y.L. Forum 613, at 614 (1966).
24 The problem is further complicated where the suspect may have intentionally altered
the gun barrel or switched gun barrels.
25 Note, supra n.10 at 730.
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NAA results should not be made binding on a jury. When testing for
chemical residues, NAA suffers from the same defects as the now discredited
paraffin tests. The paraffin test was supposed to reveal whether the suspect had
recently fired a gun as evidenced by the presence of dermal nitrates. But, dermal
nitrates can come from sources other than firing a gun. Urine, nicotine and
fertilizer leave nitrate residues. When the NAA is used to test for the presence
of dermal nitrates it may reveal such presence, but the issue is, where the residue
originated. In fact, whenever NAA is used to test for residues which can be
accounted for in a manner other than the one sought to be ascribed to the pres-
ence of the residue, the limited value of this evidence is unduly emphasized by
a conclusive rule. To say the presence of the residue is conclusive and binding
on the jury subverts the issue of the meaning of the evidence. A suspect is then
forced to account for what may literally be inexplicable, even to a scientist. The
defendant would have to try to compile a history of his contact with various
chemicals.
Blood grouping tests to exclude the putative father in paternity cases are
said to be 99.99% biologically accurate. The .01% inaccuracy is caused by
mutations of the blood. Thus, some argue that the results should be binding on
a jury regardless of witness testimony to the contrary. The problem here is that
99.99% biological accuracy translates into a 99% legal accuracy.2 6 The result
is, rather than one in one thousand people with mutated blood wrongly excluded,
one in one-hundred people should not have been exonerated. This result is
caused by the probability factor of finding the one in one thousand people with
mutated blood in a given sector. The enactment of a conclusionary rule would
serve to institutionalize this legal error of 1%. In spite of the plaintiff's in-
sistence that defendant is the father, every one in one hundred actual fathers
would be wrongfully excluded. Also, because blood tests go to the ultimate issue
in a paternity case, if the defendant is excluded as a matter of law, a verdict
would have to be directed thereby depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to
present what may be compelling evidence that this case is the one in one
hundred exception to the rule.
The above examples of problems concerning reliable scientific evidence do
not purport to discredit the overall value of these sciences. But, the examples
are designed to demonstrate that enactment of a rule of conclusiveness will not
be free of difficulies. These problems cast doubt on the feasibility of a conclusive
rule.
Berry v. Chaplin27 is the case most often cited by those who clamor for the
taking away from the jury the right to reject scientific evidence. The A and B
blood test demonstrated Charlie Chaplin could not have fathered the child
involved. Yet, the jury found that he was the father because the scientific evi-
26 Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 466
(1958).
27 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1950).
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dence had the same weight as the plaintiff's testimony and the jury believed the
plaintiff.
Even if a conclusive rule had been in force at the time of the Chaplin case,
it should not have been applied. The A and B test indicated exclusion of Chaplin
but, the M and N test results were inconclusive. And, no counter-test to ascertain
the validity of the A and B test was run.
In view of these doubts, the Chaplin jury probably rejected the scientific
evidence. More likely they were motivated by other considerations which had
more meaning to them than the blood test. A jury purveys the type of justice
people want because it reflects contemporary community standards. 28 Thus, a
desire to legitimize the child and a desire to find a financially responsible person
to care for the child could have motivated the jury.29 This consideration, stand-
ing alone, is quite analogous to the "deep pocket" theory of tort law. But this
consideration was not standing alone as moral considerations were also present.
In the Chaplin case, and another often noted Maine case,"0 the defendant told
others that he thought he was the father and he admitted to the illicit relation-
ship. In two other paternity cases, less often referred to, blood tests excluded
the putative father and the defendant denied the relationship. The defendant was
exonerated in each of those cases.31 Enactment of a conclusive rule will prevent
a jury from considering such factors, and it will leave the jury with the per-
functory role of announcing the result dictated by the rule in paternity cases.
Another factor ignored by the critics of the Chaplin verdict is the ability of
the judge to determine that blood tests should be treated as conclusive. Is a
judge expected to survey an entire branch of science and then extend judicial
notice? Or, is the judge to accept the word of the partisan expert before him
that the findings are so reliable as to be conclusive? What test is to be used by
the judge? In the area of admissibility of scientific evidence the courts still use
the Frye test (general acceptance in the community) to exclude the polygraph.3 2
But in the Coppolino case33 the test was one of whether the scientific technique
was reproducible regardless of general acceptance. Thus the test for admissibility
does not aid the judge.
The function of determining conclusiveness of scientific evidence must nec-
essarily be left to the legislature where resources to investigate and power to
change the law exist. In six states legislatures enacted the Uniform Paternity
Act after "undesirable" verdicts. Thus, to criticize courts when a Chaplin case
occurs is unfair.
28 Clark, The American Jury, 1 Val. U. L. Rev. 1 (1966).
29 Note, supra n.10, at 648.
30 Jordan v. Davis, 143 Me. 185, 57 A.2d 209 (1948).
31 Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me. 351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949) ; C v. C., 200 Misc. 631, 109 N.Y.S.2d
276 (1951).
32 See, Boyce supra n.11 for a general discussion of the application of the Frye test.
33 Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (2d Dist. Fla. 1969).
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CONCLUSIVENESS
A rule making reliable scientific evidence binding on a jury will generate
problems which effect our present system of justice. A reconsideration is nec-
essary before enactment of a conclusive rule otherwise the rule could change
basic principles of justice which should not be altered.
First, the spirit of allowing the jury to return a general verdict, permits the
jury to mitigate the harshness of the applicable law. This fact permits overall
stability of our system of laws but allows a degree of flexibility within the
system. Finding a moral duty coupled with the "deep pocket" theory in paternity
cases is an example of this flexibility. Or, where the jury must find that the
deceased died violently before insurance recovery is permitted, juries have pro-
vided flexibility. A doctor may testify the deceased's veins were diseased causing
the veins to rupture, thus the cause of death was non-violent. Yet, the jury seized
"ruptured veins" as a violent cause of death.a3 a These situations illustrate "a
moral right in view of a legal wrong."'3 4 The consequences are contained in the
term "justice." Justice incorporates social needs as well as scientific accuracy,
but neither to the exclusion of the other. Justice may contain scientific accuracy
but scientific truth is not necessarily equated with justice as a goal of law.
A conclusive rule which dictates the ultimate resolution of a case does equate
scientific truth with legal truth. The role of the jury is rendered perfunctory in
such situations.
A danger of alienating citizenry from the judicial process also exists if a
conclusive rule is enacted. Despite the reluctance of citizens to serve on juries,
once they participate, they are favorably impressed by the judicial process.35 To
remove the element of weighing scientific evidence would remove the beneficial
effect of having scientific principles explained to the jury. A phenomenon com-
parable to the mystique that the computer is smarter than humans would result.
Thus, the jury would be told they are bound by a scientific test which they are
not given the opportunity to understand. The result is that not only the defendant
is affected, but the jury is~affected also. The more a jury is regimented by being
told they must accept that which they may desire to reject, the more the battle-
lines are drawn between the courts and science and the underdog role of the
defendant. A degree of the understanding between law and society is lost.
Enactment of a conclusive rule would necessitate a change in our present
system of partisan experts. Partisan experts evolved because "only men of
science can answer the reasoning of men of science."36 Which party an expert
represents is determined, in part, by the highest bid and the expert's personal
and professional prejudices.8 7 The testimony then given is colored either con-
53a New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wise, 251 P.2d 1058 (Okla. 1953).
S4 Richardson, supra n.19, § 3.10 at 46.
85 Lousberg, On Keeping the Civil Jury Trial, 43 Notre Dame L. 344 (1968).
30 2 Law and Contemporary Problems 401 (1935).
87 Botein, Impartial Medical Testimony, 328 Annals 75 (1960).
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sciously or subconsciously by personal and professional prejudices (including
schools of thought and professional in-group disagreements). Experts would
have to be neutralized before an objective finding could result and be given the
benefit of a conclusive rule. s8 Therefore the feasibility of court appointed ex-
perts should be considered before adoption of a conclusive rule. The alternative
is a battle of experts out of the presence of the jury where the judge the finder of
fact.
As a final point, there is a perpetual tendency for law to lag behind
changing ideas and concepts. The jury, with the flexibility now permitted it,
fills the void created by legislative inertia. 9 The conclusive rule would prevent
this result. The paraffin test to determine if the suspect recently fired a gun
provides an example of this point. At one time the paraffin test was believed
highly reliable. If, at its apex of believed conclusiveness, the test would have
been given a conclusive and binding effect on a jury, how much time would be
necessary to discredit the test, as it now has been? Even today an overwhelming
number of states permit paraffin test results into evidence in the face of dis-
creditation by experts. If the courts are unwilling to change, could the legislature
be expected to be more willing? Especially a legislature which meets only
periodically. At least under the present system, counter-experts can discredit
the paraffin test and the jury has a basis for rejecting the findings. A conclusive
rule would prevent this result. The act of not making paraffin tests conclusive
would involve a lengthly effort to change an entire structure. Injustice would be
institutionalized from the point when the paraffin test was made conclusive to
the point when the test was made not conclusive.
All scientific techniques evolve and face the same problems illustrated by
the paraffin test. New discoveries may render accepted practices obsolete or
prove techniques erroneous. Experts and counter-experts who must convince
a jury of the reliability of their techniques is the best method of preventing
injustice which results from erroneous scientific techniques. Neither the expert
nor his scientific techniques should be cloaked with the infallibility that a con-
clusive rule presumes.
CONCLUSION
In view of the limited number of cases where rejection of scientific evidence
is clearly demonstrated and in view of the safeguard of the directed verdict,
enactment of a rule making scientific findings conclusive is not necessary. The
problems which would be generated are not adequately balanced by benefits to
be realized. The slightest possible error in the scientific technique opens the
door to institutionalized injustice. The goal of law should remain justice not
scientific infallibility.
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88 Meyers, supra n.12.
89 Richardson, supra n.19 at 96,
